A Review on The Use of Deep Learning in Android Malware Detection by Naway, Abdelmonim & LI, Yuancheng
1 
 
A Review on The Use of Deep Learning in Android 
Malware Detection 
                                    
Abdelmonim Naway 1, Yuancheng LI  1 
¹ North China Electric Power University, School of Control and Computer Engineering, 2 Beinong 
Road, Champing District, Beijing, China,102206 
{abdelmonim, yuanchengli}@ncepu.edu.cn 
 
 
Abstract— Android is the predominant mobile operating system for the past few years. The prevalence of 
devices that can be powered by Android magnetized not merely application developers but also malware 
developers with criminal intention to design and spread malicious applications that can affect the normal 
work of Android phones and tablets, steal personal information and credential data, or even worse lock the 
phone and ask for ransom. Researchers persistently devise countermeasures strategies to fight back malware. 
One of these strategies applied in the past five years is the use of deep learning methods in Android malware 
detection. This necessitates a review to inspect the accomplished work in order to know where the endeavors 
have been established, identify unresolved problems, and motivate future research directions. In this work, an 
extensive survey of static analysis, dynamic analysis, and hybrid analysis that utilized deep learning methods 
are reviewed with an elaborated discussion on their key concepts, contributions, and limitations. 
 
Keywords— Android Malware Detection, Static Analysis, Dynamic Analysis, Hybrid Analysis, Deep 
Learning 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The accelerated expansion of Android malware has designated an immense obstacle in front of malware 
analysts. The researchers have constantly suggested defenses and designing novel methods to fight malware 
attacks. It is crucial for malware detection techniques to meet the menace of malware. In pursuing independent 
learning of malware identification and lowering human expert engagement, deep learning has been introduced 
into Android malware detection. Deep learning is a branch of machine learning that depends on studying various 
levels of representations, analogous to a ranking of features or notions, where top-level notions are determined 
from lower-level ones, and similar lower- level notions could assist in determining numerous top-level notions. 
Deep learning is a component of a large class of machine learning techniques that relied on learning 
representations. An observation (for instance an image) can be described by different means (e.g., a vector of 
pixels), yet some descriptions make it simpler to study tasks of concern from examples, and research in this field 
seeks to determine what makes better descriptions and how to study them. [40]. Techniques applied before deep 
learning, such as drawing separate levels of features from malicious samples for classification, which cannot 
mirror the overarching attributes of malware. Additionally, classification built on diverse varieties cast doubt on 
dimensions, time and computation resources. The utilization of deep learning for malware classification offers a 
means of building scalable machine learning models, which may handle any measure of data, without expending 
consistently of resources such as memory. Deep learning marks malware depend on the general pattern, which 
directs the distinguishing of a variety of malware attacks and their variations. Furthermore, deep learning 
conducts a profound classification and improves its accuracy because deep learning identifies more features than 
conventional machine learning methods by passing through many levels of features extraction. This enables 
deep learning models to acquire a new pattern of malware after the basic training phase. 
Recently there were issues raised about machine learning and deep learning security as machine learning 
algorithms have been devised under the presumption that training and test data pursuing the equivalent basic 
probability distribution, which causes them to be exposed to skillfully-constructed attacks infringing this 
hypothesis. Deep learning methods can be substantially influenced by adversarial attacks using the experience of 
the learning algorithm to avoid detection, or infuse harming instances into the training data to deceive the 
learning algorithm and hence create incorrect classification results [39]. In the view of these issues and after five 
years of using deep learning in Android malware detection, there is a need for a comprehensive review of the 
current state-of-the-art about what has been studied, recognize where the concentrate has been established and 
specifies the direction of needed future research. In this work, we give a thorough review of the use of deep 
learning in Android malware analysis with respect to analysis type. Then we analyze and report on existing 
literature founded on specific criteria. Finally, we recognize open issues and suggest future research directions. 
In summary, this work provides the following contribution: 
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▪ To the best of our knowledge, this is the first review on the use of deep learning techniques in Android 
malware detection 
▪ To present background information on Android malware analysis types with elaborated dissection of 
their strengths and weaknesses 
▪ To organize an inclusive review of the work accomplished in Android malware analysis using deep 
learning with static analysis, dynamic analysis and hybrid analysis 
▪ To determine the limitations of current approaches, list open issues, and recommend potential future 
works  
II. BACKGROUND IN ANDROID AND ANDROID MALWARE DETECTION 
1. Android Application Components 
Android applications are composed in Java programming language and can likewise be composed in C++. 
They are gathered and bundled in an APK (Android package). Every application keeps running in a different 
process and is made up of a required XML descriptor document called AndroidManifest.xml. The Android 
Manifest document contains every information required by the Android framework about the application. The 
AndroidManifest.xml allows determining the packages, APIs, libraries required by the application, permission 
imposed and asked for by the application, etc... Applications comprised of four parts: Activity, Service, Content 
Provider, and Broadcast Receiver These parts carry information through messages called Intents [30]. 
2. Android Malware Detection Techniques 
Mobile malware requires sophisticated analysis. One critical point of mobile phones is that they are a sensor-
based event system, which permits malware to respond to approaching SMS, position changes and so forth, 
increasing the sophistication of automated malware-analysis techniques. Moreover, the apps can use services 
and activities and integrate varied programming languages (e.g. Java and c++) in one application [33].  Resting 
on the features employed to classify an application, the analysis is organized as static analysis, dynamic analysis 
and hybrid analysis that combine static and dynamic analysis. Each one of these analyses has its strengths and 
weaknesses. In the following section, these techniques are discussed with their benefits and limitations. 
3. Static Analysis 
The static analysis screens parts of the application without really executing them. This technique incorporates 
Signature-based, Permission-based and Component-based analysis. The Signature-based strategy draws features 
and makes distinctive signs to identify specific malware. Hence, it falls short to recognize the variation or 
unidentified malware. The Permission-based strategy recognizes permission requests to distinguish malware. 
The Component-based techniques decompile the APP to draw and inspect the definition and byte code 
connections of significant components (i.e. activities, services, etc.), to identify the exposures [28] [31]. The 
principal drawbacks of static analysis are the missing of real execution paths and suitable execution conditions. 
Additionally, there exist problems in the occurrence of code obfuscation and dynamic code loading [29]. 
4. Dynamic Analysis 
The dynamic analysis technique includes the execution of the application on either a virtual machine or a 
physical device. Amid the examination, the behavior of the application is watched and can be dissected. The 
dynamic analysis results in a less abstract perspective of application than static analysis. The code paths 
executed during runtime are a subset of every single accessible path. The principle objective of the analysis is to 
achieve high code inclusion since every feasible event ought to be activated to watch any possible malicious 
behavior [32]. The principal drawbacks of dynamic analysis are: dynamic analysis requires such considerable 
resources with respect to static analysis, which obstructs it from being distributed on resources limited cell 
phones. Further, dynamic analysis is liable for low-code coverage. Lately, the malware has been trying to 
recognize the emulator and other dynamic analysis framework and abstaining from exhibiting their payloads. 
Hence, some dynamic analysis frameworks are vulnerable to analysis evasion [29]. 
5. Hybrid Analysis 
The hybrid analysis technique includes consolidating static and dynamic features gathered from examining 
the application and drawing data while the application is running, separately. Nevertheless, it would boost the 
accuracy of the identification [27], [30].  The principal drawback of hybrid analysis it consumes the Android 
system resources and takes a long time to perform the analysis. 
III. DEEP LEARNING ALGORITHMS 
Adopting the right classification algorithm in line with the purpose of detection is essential considering its 
effects on detection performance and accuracy. In Table 1, the frequently used deep learning algorithms in 
Android malware detection are concisely introduced. For more information about deep learning algorithms, 
readers can refer to [35] and [38]. In [34] a detailed description of the variations of different deep learning 
algorithms is demonstrated. In addition [36], [37], and [38] shows the implementation of deep learning in 
different fields. 
TABLE I COMMONLY USED DEEP LEARNING ALGORITHMS 
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Algorithms Strengths Weaknesses 
Deep Neural Network (DNN) common deep 
learning method used for classification. Comprised 
of more than 2 hidden layers. 
Accomplished success in 
different applications 
The learning process could be time 
consuming 
Restricted Boltzmann Machines (RBM) are 
utilized as generative models of various kinds of 
data, which can study a likelihood dispersion over a 
specific arrangement of its inputs. In their 
conditional configuration, they can be utilized to 
show high dimensional temporal series, for example, 
sound or video streams. 
- Allow to produce samples look 
as if they come from the data 
distribution 
- It can be used as features 
extractor to train other models 
on top of it  
- Hard to train well 
- Computing the likelihood is time 
consuming 
 
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) A CNN 
comprises three layers, i.e., convolutional layer, 
subsampling layer (pooling layer) and fully-
connected layer. The convolutional layer utilizes the 
convolution procedure to accomplish the weight 
sharing. The subsampling layer strives to decrease 
the dimension of the feature map. It can be applied 
by an average pooling procedure or a max pooling 
procedure. Thereafter, many fully-connected layers 
and a SoftMax layer are placed on the top layer for 
classification and recognition. The deep 
convolutional neural network commonly contains 
several convolutional layers and subsampling layers 
for feature learning on large-scale images. 
- Fewer neuron connections 
needed in regard to a standard 
NN. 
- Numerous variations to CNN 
have been developed  
- Usually, it needs multiple layers 
to discover a complete hierarchy of 
visual features 
- Commonly it needs a big dataset 
of tagged images 
 
Deep Belief Network (DBN) made of different 
layers of stochastic, hidden variables. The upper two 
layers with indiscriminate, symmetric associations 
between them. The lower layers get top-down, 
directed associations from the layer above. 
Offer layer by layer learning 
approach to initialize the 
network 
The training phase consumes 
system resources because of the 
initialization process and sampling. 
Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) is convenient to 
handle flows of data. They are made by one network 
doing a similar work for each component in a 
succession, with each yield value dependent on the 
past computations. 
- Modeling time dependencies 
- Able to remember serial events 
 
Learning process suffers from 
vanishing gradient problem (large 
change in the value of parameters 
for the early layers doesn't have a 
big effect on the output) 
Deep Autoencoder is a sort of DNN whose 
intended output is the data input itself. 
- Applied to feature extraction/ 
dimensionality reduction. 
- Many variants to DAE have 
been proposed 
- It needs pre-training phase 
- It Doesn’t have the capacity to 
figure out what data is pertinent 
IV. RELATED REVIEWS 
To our knowledge, this is the first review on the use of deep learning in Android malware detection. 
Notwithstanding, there exist reviews that surveyed different issues related to Android malware detection. K. 
Tam et al. [54] exhibited a wide review of Android malware analysis and detection techniques and evaluated 
their efficiency against progressive malware. Li Li et al. [48] presented a review of studies that statically analyze 
Android applications, from which they point out the directions of static analysis approaches, and reciting the 
major areas where future research is still needed. P. et al. [49] provided an extensive review of the works in 
dynamic mobile malware detection along with adequate analysis and comparison of the different approaches. 
Saba Rashid et al. [50] surveyed the work of hybrid Android malware analysis in a period of seven years. Then, 
they relied on the advantages and disadvantages of existing techniques to propose SAMADROID a hybrid 
Android malware analysis system. Alireza Sadeghi et al. [53] conducted an exhaustive review of Android 
security and came up with taxonomy to classify and identify the current research in this field. 
We believe this work complements the previous reviews by surveying the use of deep learning in Android 
malware detection and fulfilling some research gaps in the field of Android malware analysis. 
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V. THE METHODOLOGY 
The methodology that applied to collect Data for this review 
▪  Determination of the relevant information gathered from publications in the literature 
▪  Then, listing the various search keywords that let the probing of the pertinent set of publications 
▪  Conducting the search process in the publication repositories 
▪  To confine the review on the pertinent papers, an exclusion criterion is implemented on the search 
results 
▪ Finally, the papers are collected from different repositories to make the inclusive list of the review  
1. Search keywords 
The key word used to perform the search can be summarized as: 
Deep learning for Android malware detection; applying /using deep learning techniques in Android malware 
detection + analysis. We also use some of the deep learning strategies in the search such as: using the 
convolutional neural network in Android malware analysis; using deep belief network in Android malware 
analysis; using the recurrent neural network in Android malware analysis. 
2. The Search Databases 
Repository probe is aimed at finding significant publications. The following online repositories are searched: 
ACM Digital Libraries (https://dl.acm.org); Science Direct (https://www.sciencedirect.com); Web of 
Knowledge (https:// webofknowledge.com); IEEE Xplore Digital Library (https://ieeexplore.ieee.org); Cornell 
University Library (https://arxiv.org); SpringerLink (https://link.springer.com). 
3 Exclusion Criteria 
To make sure the search results are relevant to the review, the following exclusion criteria are used: 
▪  Duplicated papers that are found in multiple repositories 
▪  There are some papers about using Deep learning for malware detection in windows operating 
system, and in intrusion detection systems. All non-Android papers are removed 
▪  Papers published in a non-English language 
▪  Papers that are not published in their final version 
In total, we collected 26 research papers from August 2014 (Date of publishing first work applied deep learning 
method in Android malware detection) to August 2018. 17 papers out of the 25 papers used static analysis. 4 
papers employed dynamic analysis, and 5 papers utilized hybrid analysis. 
VI. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Static Analysis 
W. Li et al. [4] implemented a malware identification system utilizing deep learning method, which uses both 
dangerous API calls and risky permission combinations as features to construct a DBN model, which can 
automatically recognize malware from benign ones. They proposed scheme tested on the Drebin dataset, and the 
results showed that the model obtained 90% accuracy. Yi Zhang et al. [17] developed DeepClassifyDroid to 
identify Android malware resting on CNN. The proposed system executes static analysis to attain five diverse 
features. The system tested on a dataset contains 10,770 apps in total, involving 5546 malicious and 5224 
benign. The results revealed that the approach's accuracy was 97.4%. M. Ganesh et al. [26] designed a deep 
learning system for Android malware detection. The proposed approach employs static analysis to acquire 
permission from the apps. Then, the requested permissions are converted into an image file that can be dealt 
with by a deep learning model. After that, the model is trained with image files. The model was tested on 
unbalanced data, including 2000 malware apps and 500 benign apps. The model accomplished 93% accuracy. 
The authors suggested that deep learning offers an extensible and exact solution for Android malware 
characterization because it determines malware relying on patterns instead of signatures. 
Dali Zhu et al. [9] presented DeepFlow, a malware detection system that builds on data streams inside 
malignant apps that may contrast essentially from ones inside good apps, however, might be like different 
malignant apps to some degree. DeepFlow uses such contrasts and correspondences to consequently distinguish 
novel apps whether they are malignant or not by utilizing a deep learning model. Then, a classification model 
was built based on DBN. The proposed model was tested on 3000 benign apps and 8000 malicious apps and 
reached a 95.05% F1-Score. S. Hou et al. [12] proposed DroidDelver an Android malware detector stands on the 
API call block features drawn from the smali code. The extracted feature depicts statically drawn API call 
blocks from the smali codes. A DBN classifier was applied to classify unknown malware. DroidDelver 
evaluated on a dataset involved 2,500 benign apps and 2,500 and DroidDelver acquired 96.66% accuracy.  
S. Hou et al. [5] suggested an alternative to applying API calls, they categorized the API calls which occurred 
in the same method within the smali code. Then, they developed AutoDroid (automatic Android malware 
detection) employing DBN depending on API call blocks. Experimental results performed on 2500 benign apps 
and 2500 malware showed that the best accuracy of the DBN was 95.98 %.  L. Shiqi et al. [2] proposed image 
texture-based classification by converting APK binary data into image and utilized DBN to extract image 
texture. They also extracted some other features such as API calls, used permissions, and Activity. The scheme 
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was tested on DREBIN dataset, and the results demonstrated that image texture when combined with API calls, 
gives the best accuracy of 95.6%.  N. McLaughlin et al. [10] taking a different approach to facing Android 
malware challenges. They explored the utilization of CNN to malware identification by handling the dismantled 
byte-code of an application as a text to be broken down. This methodology has the benefit that features are 
automatically gained from raw data and subsequently eliminates the requirement for malware signatures to be 
planned by hand. The researchers performed experiments using three datasets: Genome project dataset; two 
additional large datasets provided by McAfee Labs. The model has different accuracy on different datasets, in 
the Genome dataset, the model has achieved 98% accuracy. In McAfee datasets, the model has accomplished 
80% and 87% respectively. 
 R. Nix et al. [23] they concentrated on program analysis that looks at Android API calls made by an 
application. API calls depict how an application transmits information with the Android OS. Such transmission 
is basic for an application to do its jobs, thus giving essential data on an application's behavior. The authors 
planned a (CNN) sequence classification, which conducted convolution tasks along the sequences, learning 
successive shapes for every area as the convolution window slides down the sequence. The CNN structure 
additionally utilized different CNN layers to develop more elevated features from small local features. The 
model evaluated using a dataset includes 1016 APK files and obtained 99.4% accuracy. Wei Wang et al. [22] 
seeking to ameliorate accuracy of large-scale Android malware detection by designing a hybrid system formed 
on deep autoencoder (DAE) as pre-training procedure and different CNN structures for malware identification. 
An empirical test conducted on a dataset incorporates 23,000 apps, and results showed that the CNN-P structure 
gets a high accuracy of 99.8%.   
E. Karbab et al. [3] developed MalDozer, a system depends on an artificial neural network that receives, as 
input, the raw sequences of API method calls, as they come from the DEX file, to allow malware identification 
and family ascription. In training, MalDozer can determine malicious patterns in an automatic way utilizing just 
sequences of raw method calls in the assembly code. They performed a comprehensive test on various datasets 
containing malware and good apps. The results exhibited that MalDozer was productive and viable in malware 
detection, but less effective in family attribution.  
T. Huang and H. Kao [11] proposed a color-compounded convolutional neural networks-based Android 
Malware Detection that instead of features extraction depending on color representation for transforming 
Android apps into RGB color code and converting them to unchanged-sized translated images. Afterward, the 
encoded image is sent to CNN to automate feature extraction and learning. The proposed approach tested on 
huge dataset, the best accuracy achieved, was 93%.  C. Hasegawa and H. Iyatomi [1] developed a light-weight 
malware identification system that utilized 1-D CNN and analyzed a small part of the raw APK file without 
unpackaging. A test conducted on dataset consists of 5,000 malware and 2,000 good apps. Although high 
accuracy was reported, a further evaluation of the suggested approach is needed.  
K. Xu et al. [25] suggested the DeepRefiner malware characterization system uses deep neural networks with 
different hidden layers to automate features extraction. In a preprocessing step, DeepRefiner recovered XML 
values from XML files in the first detection layer and seized bytecode semantics from the dismantled 
classes.dex file in the second detection layer. DeepRefiner then signified apps as vectors, which were utilized as 
inputs for deep neural networks. The hidden layers in neural systems consequently build identification features 
from input vectors through non-linear translation. DeepRefiner was tested on a large dataset, including 62,915 
malware apps and 47,525 benign apps. The results showed that DeepRefiner malware detection accuracy was 
97.74%. D. Li et al [6] Developed a system built on a Deep neural network that applied static features namely 
required permissions and API calls to train the model to classify Android malware. DREBIN dataset was used to 
evaluate the performance of the model which reached 95.64% F1-Score. 
X. Su et al. [13] designed DroidDeep a deep learning strategy for Android malware identification which 
examined different levels of features. DroidDeep first explored static data involving permissions, API calls, and 
deployment of components for distinguishing the behavioral patterns of Android apps and drawing out multiple 
features set from Android apps. Then, these features were fed into a deep learning model to study representative 
features for classification. Lastly, the studied features were forwarded into a detector built on the Support Vector 
Machine (SVM) for identifying Android malware. DroidDeep was tested with 3,986 benign apps and 3,986 
malware and accomplished 99.4% accuracy. Zi Wang et al. [21] designed DroidDeepLearner, a malware 
identification system for Android platform employing deep learning an algorithm, which utilizes both dangerous 
API calls and risky permission combinations as features to construct a DBN model, which is capable of 
automatic detection of Android malicious apps from benign ones. Experiments carried out on 6,334 apps in total 
and DroidDeepLearner achieved 93.09% accuracy. 
2. Dynamic Analysis 
H. Liang et al. [16] developed natural language processing techniques for Android malware analysis on the 
assumption that there is a similarity between theme drawing and malware identification. They designed a model 
that deals with system call sequences as texts and considers the malware detection function as theme extraction. 
The proposed approach was tested on a dataset of 14,231 apps. The results showed that the accuracy was 
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93.16%. F. Martinelli et al. [7] established their work on the hypothesis that there is a correspondence between 
sentiment analysis and malware analysis. Negative and positive sentiments are equivalent to maliciousness and 
benignity of apps. They built a deep learning model that used CNN to distinguish between trusted and malicious 
applications. The model tested on a dataset contains 7,100 apps, and obtained accuracy between 85% and 90%.   
S. Hou et al. [18] proposed an automatic Android malware detection system Deep4MalDroid. Depending on a 
graph representation of extracted Linux system call, the Stacked Autoencoders (SAEs) was applied to scan 
general patterns of malware and thus to determine newly unknown malicious applications. Experimental results 
on a dataset of 3000 apps showed that the best accuracy reached was 93.68%. L. Singh and M. Hofmann [20] 
mainly developed conventional machine learning models and one deep learning model standing on runtime 
behavior (system calls). Experimental results showed that the accuracy of 97.16% was achieved using the SVM 
classifier, which performed better than Decision Tree, Random Forest, Gradient boosted trees, Neural network, 
K-NN, and DNN. This is because the utilized data set was small, it contains 494 malicious and benign apps. As 
deep learning is data hungry testing with larger dataset can give different results.   
3. Hybrid Analysis 
Z. Yuan at al. developed Droid-sec [8] considered the first attempt to apply deep learning in Android 
malware detection. The authors use numerous features to compose Deep Belief network models that are able to 
classify malware from benign ones. The model performance evaluated on small dataset includes 250 benign 
apps and 250 malware samples. The results emphasized the use of deep learning in Android malware 
identification, and the model obtained 96% accuracy. Z. Yuan at al.  Designed Droid Detector [24] another 
model based on DBN. The proposed approach was tested on a large unbalanced dataset that involves 20000 
benign and malware samples. The results indicated a good performance of DBN with 96.76% accuracy.  L. Xu 
et al.  presented HADM [14] an Android malware identification approach that depends on autoencoders to study 
the features of the apps, then built an SVM classifier to differentiate the apps as malicious or trusty. They 
conducted experiments on a dataset of 5888 benign and malware and evaluated the performance of static and 
dynamic features separately. The result showed that static features have better performance than dynamic 
features.  
H. Alshahrani et al. [15] developed DDefender a malware identification system comprises of two 
fundamental parts: First, client side, a light application running on the client's phone to preform dynamic 
analysis and present clients with analysis results. Second, server side, a framework that preforms static analysis 
and detection procedure and sends the outcomes back to the client side. The dynamic analysis was used to draw 
system calls, system information and network traffic from targeted applications. Then static analysis employed 
to draw substantial features from the targeted application. A deep neural network applied to build a mode that 
tested on a dataset of 4208 benign and malicious apps. The model achieved 95% accuracy.  R. Vinayakumar et 
al [19] proposed the use of Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) which is a particular kind of recurrent neural 
network applied to study long-term transient dynamics with a series of random lengths for Android malware 
characterization. The authors extracted dynamic and static features and used a dataset of 1738 for model 
performance evaluation, which accomplished 93.9% in dynamic analysis and 97.5 in static analysis.  
Premised on the previous review we compare these approaches using 10 criteria separately in Tables 2-4. 
These criteria are: key concept; features used for malware detection; dataset; place of analysis (on device, server, 
etc...); Realtime detection; algorithms used; used measures with their values; contribution; limitation; 
availability for public (check if the researchers allow access to their dataset and work for the public). 
VII. CHALLENGES, OPEN ISSUES, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
1. Open Issues 
According to the review and discussion, in the following sections, a number of open issues are presented. 
1.1 Datasets Issues 
There are some problems regarding the datasets used for model evaluation such as: 
Getting Representative data set that reflect the distribution of malicious and benign apps in the real world. How 
to determine and select strong, discriminative features whether they are hand engineered or selected by an 
algorithm persists open issue. Moreover, as shown in Tables 2-4 there are only two works that make their work 
accessible to the public. Lack of standard Android malware datasets called for sharing datasets among research 
communities. 
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TABLE  2 COMPARISON OF ANDROID STATIC ANALYSIS MALWARE DETECTION TECHNIQUES 
Ref. Publish
ing 
Year 
Key Concept Features Dataset Total 
Dataset 
Place of 
Analysis 
Real 
Time 
Detec
tion 
Used 
Algori
thms 
Measur
es 
Values Contribution Limitation Availability 
to the 
public 
[13] 2016 Static 
Features 
Requested 
permissions-used 
permissions-
sensitive API 
calls-Actions-app 
components 
3986 B from 
Google play-
3986 M from 
DREBIN 
7972 
Apps 
Computer No DBN F1 
Prec. 
Recall 
97.3 
98.2 
98.4 
Presented DroidDeep for 
malware detection using 
DBN 
Susceptible to 
adversarial attack 
No 
[21] 2016 Static 
Features 
Risky 
Permissions-
dangerous API 
calls 
- 6334 
Apps 
Computer No DBN F1 
Prec. 
Recall 
94.5 
93.09 
94.5 
Proposed 
DroidDeepLearner 
combine risky permission 
and dangerous API calls to 
build a DBN classification 
model.  
Susceptible to 
adversarial attack 
No 
[12] 2016 Static 
Features 
API call blocks Comodo cloud 
security- 2500 
B-2500 M 
5000 
Apps 
Computer No DBN ACC 96.66 Developed DroidDelver A 
detection system utilizes an 
API call block to identify 
malware. 
Susceptible to 
adversarial attack 
No 
[26] 2017 Static 
Features 
Requested 
permission 
5000 B from 
APKMirror-
APK4fun 
2000 M from 
Genome-
DREBIN  
2500 
Apps 
Server Yes CNN-
Alex 
Net 
Acc 93 Proposed a detection 
system that transforms 
requested permissions into 
an image format, then use 
CNN for classification 
- Depend only on 
permissions with their 
known limitations 
-  Susceptible to 
impersonate attack 
No 
[9] 2017 Static data 
flow analysis 
323 features 3000 B from 
Google play-
8000 M from 
virusshare and 
Genome 
11000 
Apps 
Computer No DBN F1 95.05 Designed FlowDroid an 
identification system 
leverages data flow 
analysis to identify 
malware. 
Susceptible to 
adversarial attack 
No 
[5] 2017 API calls 1058 API calls Comodo cloud 
security-2500 
B-2500 M 
5000 
Apps 
Computer No DBN 
SAE 
ACC 
ACC 
96.66 
95.98 
Developed AutoDroid for 
malware detection using 
DBN and SAE 
Susceptible to 
adversarial attack 
No 
[10] 2017 Opcode 
Sequence 
Learn to detect 
sequences of 
opcode that 
indicate malware 
Genome-
McAfee Labs 
27377 
Apps 
Computer No CNN ACC 
Prec. 
Recall 
F1 
98 
99 
95 
97 
Developed a detection 
system that relies on 
automatic features learning 
from raw data and treating 
the disassembled code as 
text 
Although trained on a 
large dataset, 
performance dropped 
when tested on a new 
dataset- Susceptible to 
impersonate attack 
No 
[23] 2017 Static 
Features 
API call 
sequence 
216 M from 
Contagio 
minidump- 
1016 B from 
third-party 
market 
1232 
Apps 
Computer No CNN Acc 
Prec. 
Recall 
99.4 
100 
98.3 
Apply multiple layers of 
CNN to learn the features, 
then classify apps based on 
API call sequence 
Susceptible to 
impersonate attack 
No 
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Ref. Publishi
ng Year 
Key Concept Features Dataset Total 
Dataset 
Place of 
Analysis 
Real 
Time 
Detec
tion 
Used 
Algorit
hms 
Measur
es 
Values Contribution Limitation Availability 
to the 
public 
[11] 2017 Transfer 
classes.dex 
into RGB 
color images 
Extract features 
from the 
transferred 
images 
Collected by 
the 
researchers  
829356 
Apps 
Server No CNN Acc 97.7 
 
Proposed color 
representation for 
translating Apps into 
RGB color image which 
is fed to CNN for 
automatic features 
learning 
Results revealed 
that human experts 
are still needed in 
long-term sample 
collection and 
model updates. 
Susceptible to 
impersonate attack 
Shared the 
converted 
images on 
a website 
[4] 2018 Static 
features 
Dangerous API 
calls-risky 
permissions 
1400 B from 
Google play- 
1400M from 
DREBIN  
2800 
Apps 
Computer No DBN Recall 94.28 Utilized DBN to build 
automatic malware 
classifier 
Susceptible to 
adversarial attack 
No 
[17] 2018 Static 
features 
API calls-
Permissions-
Intent filters 
5224 B from 
Chinese 
third-party 
market-5546 
M from 
DREBIN 
10770 
Apps 
Computer No CNN Prec 
Recall 
ACC 
F1 
96.6 
98.3 
97.4 
97.4 
Presented 
DeepClassifyDroid 
Android malware 
detection system based 
on CNN 
Susceptible to 
impersonate attack 
No 
[2] 2018 Static 
features 
API calls DREBIN 6965 
Apps 
Computer No DBN Acc 95.7 Proposed an image 
texture analysis 
approach for malware 
detection  
Susceptible to 
adversarial attack 
No 
[22] 2018 Static 
features 
Permissions-
requested 
permissions-
filtered intents-
restricted API 
calls-hardware 
features-code 
related features-
suspicious API 
calls 
10000 B 
from Anzhi 
play store-
1300 M from 
virusshare 
23000 
Apps 
Computer No CNN Acc 
Recall 
F1 
99.8 
99.91 
99.82 
Developed a hybrid 
model for malware 
detection using CNN 
and DAE 
Susceptible to 
impersonate attack 
No 
[3] 2018 Static 
features 
API sequence 
calls 
Genome-
Virusshare-
DREBIN-
Contagio 
minidump 
33000 
Apps 
IOT 
devices-
Computer
-Server 
Yes CNN F1 
Prec 
Recall 
96.29 
96.29 
96.29 
Designed MalDozer an 
Android malware 
detection system that 
identifies malware and 
tries to attribute it to its 
family by applying NLP 
techniques 
- Affected by 
dynamic code 
loading and 
obfuscation. 
Besides, family 
attribution is limited 
- Susceptible to 
impersonate attack 
No 
TABLE  2 (continued) 
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 Publis
hing 
Year 
Key 
Concept 
Features Dataset Total 
Dataset 
Place of 
Analysis 
Real 
Time 
Dete
ction 
Used 
Algor
ithms 
Measures Values Contribution Limitation Availability 
to the public 
[25] 2018 Static 
Features 
The semantic 
structure of 
Android 
bytecode 
Google 
play-
virusshare-
Masset 
110440 
Apps   
Computer No CNN
-
LST
M 
Acc 97.74 Proposed DeepRefiner 
to identify malware by 
using LSTM on the 
semantic structure of 
Android bytecode 
It needs a frequent 
update with new 
labeled features-
Heavy computation 
resources are 
required- 
Susceptible to 
impersonate attack 
No 
[6] 2018 Static 
Features 
Permissions-
API Calls 
DREBIN – 
5560 M- 
123453 B 
129013 
Apps 
Computer No DNN Prec 
Recall 
F1 
97.15 
94.18 
95.64 
Implemented malware 
detection engine based 
on DNN 
Susceptible to 
adversarial attack 
No 
[1] 2018 Static 
Features 
Code Analysis 2000 B 
from 
APKpure 
and 
APPsapk-
5000 M 
from AMD 
and 
DREBIN 
7000 
Apps 
Computer No CNN Acc 95.4 Proposed a method 
that uses 1-D CNN to 
analyze a small 
portion of raw APK 
The approach 
requires further 
analysis to prove it 
is efficien 
No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE  2 (continued) 
10 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3 COMPARISON OF ANDROID DYNAMIC ANALYSIS MALWARE DETECTION TECHNIQUES 
 
Ref. Publish
ing 
Year 
Key 
Concept 
Features Dataset Total 
Dataset 
Place of 
Analysis 
Real 
Time 
Detec
tion 
Used 
Algori
thms 
Measures Values Contribution Limitation Availability 
to the 
public 
[18] 2016 Dynamic 
Features 
System calls Comodo 
cloud 
security- 
1500 B- 
1500 M 
3000 
Apps 
Computer No SAE Acc 93.68 Proposed dynamic 
behavior malware 
detection by 
monitoring the 
system call of an 
app during 
execution 
The proposed 
methodology may 
not cover all 
events during 
execution. Besides, 
it is not immune to 
evasion techniques 
No 
[7] 2017 Dynamic 
Features 
System Calls 3536 B from 
Google Play 
– 3564 from 
DREBIN 
7100 
Apps 
Computer No CNN Acc 85-95 Developed a 
detection system 
built on CNN that 
utilizes system calls 
collected from the 
dynamic run of apps 
Apps are executed 
for 60 seconds 
only, which is not 
enough to capture 
all app events. 
Additionally, the 
method is not 
immune to evasion 
techniques  
No 
[16] 2017 Dynamic 
Features 
System Call 
Sequences 
10000 B, 
4231 M 
14231 
Apps 
Computer No CNN Acc 
Prec 
F1 
93.1 
95.75 
86.57 
Designed an end-to-
end malware 
identification model 
by considering 
system call 
sequences as text 
and regarding the 
malware 
characterization as 
theme extraction 
The approach is 
not resistant to 
evasion techniques  
No 
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TABLE 4 COMPARISON OF ANDROID HYBRID ANALYSIS MALWARE DETECTION TECHNIQUES 
 
Ref. Publish
ing 
Year 
Key 
Concept 
Features Dataset Total 
Dataset 
Place of 
Analysis 
Real 
Time 
Detec
tion 
Used 
Algori
thms 
Measures Values Contribution Limitation Availability 
to the 
public 
[8] 2014 Dynamic 
/Static 
features 
Sensitive API 
calls 
250 B from 
google play-
250 M from 
contagion 
minidump 
500 
Apps 
Computer No DBN Acc 93.5 The first paper 
examined the use of 
deep learning in 
Android malware 
detection 
The proposed scheme 
was evaluated on a 
small dataset. 
Yes at the 
time of 
publishing 
[24] 2016 Dynamic 
/Static 
features 
Required 
permissions-
sensitive API 
calls- apps 
actions collected 
dynamically 
20000 B 
from Google 
Play – 17604 
from 
Genome and 
contagion 
minidump 
21700 
Apps 
Server Yes DBN Prec 
Recall 
97.79 
95.68 
Developed a system 
that aggregates static 
and dynamic 
features and applies 
DBN to detect 
malware 
The dynamic analysis 
may not detect 
malware provided 
with anti-analysis 
techniques 
No 
[14] 2016 Dynamic 
/Static 
features 
9 static features- 
system call from 
the dynamic 
running of an app 
4002 B from 
Google play, 
1886 M from 
virusshare 
5888 
Apps 
Computer No DNN Acc 
 
93.4 
 
Designed HADM a 
hybrid Android 
malware 
identification system 
based on DNN 
Malware can detect 
the emulator used in 
dynamic analysis and 
may not exhibit any 
malicious behavior  
No 
[15] 2018 Dynamic 
/Static 
features 
Permissions-
Intents-app 
components-
network 
activities-Linux 
system call- 
2104 B, 
2104 M from 
DREBIN 
and Marvin 
4208 Server Yes DNN ACC 95 Developed 
DDefender Android 
malware identifier 
that can run on 
user's device 
Monkey Tool used in 
the dynamic analysis 
may not be able to 
generate all the 
events that a malware 
can make. There is an 
overhead for 
uploading an APK to 
a server for analysis. 
No 
[19] 2018 Dynamic 
/Static 
features 
Permissions-
events generated 
by Monkey Tool 
279 B 
and279 M 
for static 
analysis-408 
B and 1330 
M for 
dynamic 
analysis  
2296 Computer No RNN
LST
M 
  Proposed use of 
RNN and LSTM for 
Android malware 
detection 
Apps were running in 
the emulator for a 
short time. Malware 
can detect there are 
being run in the 
emulator and 
refrained from 
showing any 
malicious activities 
No 
B: benign. M: malware. Acc: accuracy. Prec: precision. F1: F1-Score.CNN: convolutional neural network. SAE: Stacked Autoencoder. LSTM: Long Short-Term Memory. 
RNN: recurrent neural network. DNN: deep neural network.
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1.2 Concept Drift 
    Concept drift is a problem that ensues the swift rise in the number of Android malicious apps and trusty apps 
along with fast technological development in the Android environment [43]. As can be seen in Tables 2-4 old 
datasets such as DREBIN are still widely used, and this makes the models built on it liable for concept drift. 
DeepRefiner [25] is the only work among the reviewed papers that implicitly approached the concept drift 
problem and suggested continual updates of the model. Otherwise, the model will yield equivocal predictions.  
How to effectively discern the existence of concept drift and solve it stays an open issue.  
1.3 Deep Learning Security Issues 
     There are challenges regarding attacking deep learning models (including Android malware detection models) 
in the training phase and testing phase abided unsolved. In the training phase, the models are subject to data 
poisoning attacks, which are merely implemented by manipulating the training and instilling data that make a 
deep learning model to commit errors. In the testing phase, the models are exposed to several attack types [44]:  
▪  Adversarial Attacks: are attacks into deep learning model inputs that an adversary has invented 
deliberately to cause the model to make mistakes, 
▪  Evasion attack:  the intruder exploits malevolent instances at test time to have them incorrectly 
classified as benign by a trained classifier, without having an impact over the training data. The 
intruder's objective in this manner adds up to breaching system integrity, either with a targeted or 
with an indiscriminate attack according to his purpose, 
▪  Impersonate attack: opt to mimic data instances from targets, distinctly, an attacker plans to create 
particular adversarial instances to such an extent that current deep learning-based models mistakenly 
characterize original instances with different tags from the imitated ones, 
▪     Inversion attack: use the APIs allowed by machine learning systems to assemble some fundamental 
data with respect to the target system models. This kind of attack is divided into two types: white-
box attack and black-box one. In particular, the white-box attack implies that an aggressor can 
loosely get to and download learning models and other supporting data, while the black-box one 
points to the way that the aggressor just knows the APIs opened by learning models and some 
observation after providing input. 
All of the reviewed works could be vulnerable to one or more types of these attacks. Amongst the reviewed 
works, only DeepRefiner [25] encountered adversarial sampling and attempted adversarially training the model. 
No sufficient results were reported, the researchers planned to harden their model in future work. Hardening 
deep learning models against adversarial attacks is one of the greatest challenges facing deep learning methods. 
1.4 Deep Learning Issues 
    Recently deep learning has been subjected to a rigid assessment from different views such as [42], [46], and 
[41]. Here we reflect the open issues related to the use of deep learning in Android malware detection:  
▪ Currently available machine learning has several weaknesses such as there are all can be deceived, 
▪ Deep learning lacks transparency to provide an interpretation of the decision created by its methods. 
Malware analysts need to understand how the decision was made, 
▪ there is no assurance that classification models built based on deep learning will perform in different 
conditions with new data that would not match previous training data, 
▪ Deep learning study complex correlations within input and output feature with no innate depiction of 
causality,   
▪ Deep learning models are not autonomous and need continual retraining and rigorous parameters 
adjustments.  
As shown in Tables 2-4 there are works such as [10] and [16] tried to automate feature engineering and model 
updates, results demonstrate that deep learning models up to now are not autonomous, human expert 
involvement in feature engineering and model updates is irreplaceable. Additionally, as found in [11] there is no 
guarantee that deep learning models will be efficient in the new dataset that might not match previously trained 
dataset. 
1.5 Data Privacy Preservation 
Some work for instance [11] and [26] sends data for analysis to a remote server, in such a situation the privacy 
of the data ought to be preserved.  Despite a previous study [49] have referred to this issue, it has stayed 
unaddressed. 
2. Future Directions 
  The objective of analysis: according to the taxonomy of [53], the objectives of Android malware analysis is 
divided into three: malware detection, vulnerability detection, and grayware detection. As can be seen from 
Tables 2-4 the malware detection dominated the work. In the future more, work to explore vulnerability and 
grayware detection with deep learning is needed. 
2.1 Static Analysis 
As reported in [53] the static analysis contains data structure analysis and sensitivity analysis. Further data 
structure analysis divided into text-based, control flow graph (CFG), call graph (CG), and inter-procedural 
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control flow graph (ICFG). Sensitivity analysis is divided into flow sensitive, context sensitive, and path 
sensitive. As shown in Table 2 only data flow analysis has been used with deep learning methods.  Future works 
in static analysis may examine the use of deep learning with these techniques. 
2.2 Dynamic Analysis 
     In line with [53] taxonomy, there are two aspects of dynamic analysis inspection level and input generation. 
Inspection levels include application levels that trace java method invocation; kernel level collects system calls 
using kernel modules; the virtual machine intercepts events that occur within emulators. Obviously, from Table 
3 deep learning has been applied to all inspection level methods. On the other hand, input generation involves 
fuzz testing using Monkey, which is largely adopted in dynamic analysis, and symbolic execution which 
depends on symbolic values instead of actual values for program input. None of the reviewed work utilized 
dynamic analysis applied symbolic execution, future work in dynamic analysis or hybrid analysis may consider 
taking advantage of symbolic execution. 
2.3 Deep Learning Security 
    More studies are required to resolve the issues discussed in Section 7.1.4. Albeit the efforts to tackle these 
issues as mentioned in [44], still, there are no satisfactory solutions. Possible future directions are: 
▪ Improving the Robustness of the Learning Algorithms: by extending existing algorithms and examining 
the effectiveness of concepts such as stability training and smoothing model output,   
▪ Designing secure algorithms: to build algorithms that can defend against evasion attacks, 
▪ Apply dimension reduction strategy: this strategy aspires to improve the flexibility of a classifier by 
lowering the dimension of features. 
2.4 Hardening Deep Learning Models Against Adversarial Attacks 
    Researchers in [45], and [51] proposed retraining and distillation to confront adversarial attacks on deep 
learning models. The results show that there are no perfect solutions, partly because of these solutions originally 
developed for fighting adversarial attacks in the computer vision field, which is different from malware 
detection. More studies are required to investigate the use of the following techniques: 
▪ Distillation: the notion of distillation is that suppose there is already a neural network F that can classify 
training set x into target class y and generates as output a probability distribution over y. This output is 
utilized as tags to train a second model F'. Whereas the new tags include more information about the 
data x than the first model, the network will function similar to the first network, 
▪ Retraining: to retrain the classifier with adversarial generated instances.  The purpose of retraining is to 
amend the abstraction of the model. The challenge is hidden in selecting the proper number of 
adversarial training instances,  
2.5 Data Privacy Preservation 
      Considering the utilization of data encryption techniques is one way to achieve the goal of the user’s data 
privacy when uploading files for further analysis to a remote server. 
2.6 Concept Drift 
      How to describe the concept’s drift, and how to measure drift magnitude, is significant to solve the concept's 
drift problem. Ideas presented in [47] require further studies to verify if there are applicable to Android malware 
detection. 
2.7 Performance Evaluation  
    In the reviewed research there are several works used unbalanced dataset for example [24] and [26], in such 
cases considering the use of phase response curve (PRC) as proven in [52] to be a better metric in displaying 
divergences between algorithms that are not obvious in ROC space. 
VIII. CONCLUSION  
In this work, we presented a thorough review of the use of deep learning in Android malware detection. A 
comparison of existing work with respect to certain criteria was presented.  The review uncovered knowledge 
gaps in the existing work and underscores major challenges and open issues that will direct future research 
efforts. The review showed that the current literature could be exposed to different adversarial attacks and 
subjected to concept drift. Static Android malware analysis dominates the existing work. Future work may 
consider dynamic research techniques or utilizing hybrid analysis techniques. Sharing research datasets and 
tools between researchers lingered unaddressed except in a few cases. Hardening deep learning models against 
different adversarial attacks and detecting, describing and measuring concept drift are vital in future work in 
Android malware detection.  Furthermore, researchers need to bear in mind the limitation of deep learning 
methods such as lack of transparency and nonautonomous of it is model to build more efficient models. Finally, 
the results of this work can aid to promote research in Android malware detection based on deep learning 
methods. 
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